Reverberations of the Holocaust Fifty Years Later: Psychology’s Contributions to Understanding Persecution and Genocide

PETER SUEDFELD
University of British Columbia

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Abstract
The Nazi attempt to annihilate the Jewish people ended over 50 years ago, but both public and scholarly interest in the Holocaust remains intense and has a salient psychological component. The Holocaust continues to be the setting for many novels, plays, and films, and is also frequently invoked as a metaphor in policy debates such as in justification of the NATO air attacks against Yugoslavia. Holocaust-related psychological research can serve as a basis for better understanding of subsequent, and perhaps of future, ethnopolitical violence, the focus of the ongoing joint CPA-APA Ethnopolitical Warfare Initiative. This research includes theories of why people participate in genocide, the analysis of bystander and rescuer behaviour, and the development of interventions that may help to prevent or de-escalate ethnic conflicts and to ameliorate their effects. Psychological studies of Holocaust survivors have contributed to our knowledge of PTSD, the transmission of trauma to subsequent generations, and the possibility of coping and recovery after extreme stress.

In 1999, the Canadian Psychological Association celebrated its Sixtieth Anniversary convention. It is easy to think “sixtieth anniversary” without thinking back to what things were like at the time of the first CPA convention. It was 1939, a period marked by a surging tide of militant dictatorships in many parts of the world and by political confusion and economic distress in democratic nations. Neville Chamberlain had returned from Munich, assuring Europe that the abandonment of Czechoslovakia to the Nazis had guaranteed “peace in our time”; Hitler and Stalin were about to carry out their joint destruction of Poland, the beginning of the most extensive and most destructive war the world had ever seen. Notwithstanding our national myth 50 years later, Canada was about to join, to a great extent willingly and even enthusiastically, in the just war to defeat a group of truly evil empires.

The upheaval that followed shook the world. For tens of millions of people, it meant the end of life. For those who lived through it, the war remains an indelible marker by and against which the rest of life is measured. Even those who were born after it was over are imbued with its impact and consequences, from the vast battles on the Eastern Front and the Pacific Ocean to nuclear weapons, the formation of the UN, and the Cold War.

One set of images we all carry from that war attracted little attention at the time: the Nazi attempt to annihilate all Jews within reach, now — but not then — called the Holocaust. The mass murder of some six million people, including one and a half million children, has left us with the memory of countless photographs, films, television shows, books, poems, and articles.

These images are so vivid in our individual and cultural memory that the Holocaust has become one of our most salient illustrations of Tversky and Kahneman’s availability heuristic (1973). “The Holocaust” has been used as the metaphor for the Cambodian “classicide,” the Chinese suppression of Tibet, and civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. The word has been applied anachronistically to slavery and its aftermath in the United States and to the dispossession of aboriginal peoples by Europeans in Australia and the Americas. It has even been featured in the debate about legalized abortion, both in Canada and the United States. Just as each of these events has been equated — no matter how wrong-headedly — with the Holocaust, so politicians have referred to the failure of the democracies to do anything about the real Holocaust as a justification for not ignoring similar happenings now. The most recent of many examples was President Clinton’s argument for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as the refusal of current world leaders to stand by idly while another Holocaust occurs.

The Holocaust has left us with many psychological questions. The past six decades of theorizing and research have not definitively answered those questions, but we have made more substantial progress than we may realize. I review these issues partly because of the immensity of the problems and the tasks, and partly because of their relevance to current and future events that need the expertise of psychologists. In the case of the Holocaust, unfortunately, we must study the tragedy of history because it will help us to understand similar tragedies.

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today, and to prevent them or at least to ameliorate their destructiveness tomorrow.

**Psychology Addresses the Holocaust**

The Holocaust, although unique in many ways, was the precursor of more recent episodes of murderous persecution, quasi-genocide, and "ethnic cleansing" — the foci of the ongoing joint Ethnopolitical Warfare initiative of the Canadian and American Psychological Associations. One of the component projects of that initiative is the development of theories and research related to such conflicts: how they begin, how people assume the roles they do, and how psychology can contribute to predicting, preventing, ameliorating, and ending the violence.

The current paper is neither a complete nor a critical review of psychology's contributions to this effort. Rather, it is an overview of what seem to me to be our primary stepping stones (so far) on the path to understanding some of humanity's most appalling actions. Generally, I have emphasized seminal work that was published some decades ago, when studies explicitly related to violent persecution were prominent in the literature. The theories and research of the past have undergone testing, clarification, modification, and critiques that for many new ideas are ongoing or still to come. Thus, the merits and shortcomings of the classical contributions (if one can use that term for work published mostly in the 1960s and '70s) are better established than those of works produced in the past few years. It is also true that current work is to a great extent a carrying forward of those ideas; knowing where we come from is important if we want to know where we are and where we may be headed.

**Explaining the Holocaust.** Psychologists have not played a major role in identifying the origins of the Holocaust. Historians and political scientists have analyzed the Nazi Party's emergence from the chaos of the 1920s to total power over Germany in the '30s and domination over much of Europe in the early '40s. Case study interpretations of this sort also describe how Nazi leaders planned the complete annihilation of European Jewry and how they — with the active help of thousands of people from many countries and the passivity of millions of others — accomplished about two-thirds of that goal (see, for example, Yahil, 1990). Psychology's problem in this regard is that we are oriented toward producing or testing general theories of human behaviour; the APA-CPA conference on the origins of genocide (Chirot, 1998) illustrated that idiographic disciplines such as history and area studies are better suited to explaining the unique features of the Holocaust and subsequent massacres.

Psychologists and colleagues in related fields have produced studies of Hitler and his inner circle. Most of these have involved a little evidence and a lot of speculation about such topics as Hitler's genital malformation, sexual repression or perversion, inferiority complex, frustration over his failed artistic ambitions, fear of having "Jewish blood" himself, and his resentment because a Jewish doctor was unable to cure his mother's cancer (see, for example, Bullock, 1964; Langer, 1972; Waite, 1977; or for an excellent overview, Rosenbaum, 1998). Other researchers have used psychometric instruments and content analyses to examine such groups as the main Nuremberg defendants (e.g., Kelley, 1947; Rittler, 1978), key functionaries such as Adolf Eichmann (Arendt, 1977), and professional murderers such as the SS (Dicks, 1972). None of these studies has been able to pinpoint and document anything unique in the core Nazis' personalities, family backgrounds, or personal histories that it would explain their dedication to what they called the Final Solution even at the cost of reducing Germany's ability to wage war against advancing enemy armies.

More definitive psychological research on the origins of genocidal programs is highly desirable. Idiographic explanations on a country-by-country basis are certainly useful, but there must be identifiable factors that determine whether a given combination of historical, sociological, economic, geographic, and cultural conditions will or will not lead to mass killing and persecution. Presumably, at least some of these factors are in the realm of psychology. Understanding such causes of persecution could help in facilitating reconciliation between members of the opposing groups and the reconstruction not only of a damaged physical environment but also of damaged psyches and social relations. Not least may be the effect on survivors, for many of whom the sheer randomness and incomprehensibility of the event can be among its most painful consequences (Frankl, 1963; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; McCann & Pearlman, 1990).

**The psychology of perpetrators.** Psychology has done better at explaining the behaviour of the ordinary "followers" who actually carried out the atrocities of the Holocaust, and their more recent counterparts. For one thing, we understand that there is an interaction among at least three kinds of factors: situational variables (e.g., stressors); universal predispositions governing thinking, memory, perception, and emotion (e.g., cognitive heuristics, Gestalt principles); and individual differences in how people cope with the previous two characteristics. In this context, the tendency to ascribe behaviour solely to the personality and preferences of the actor is truly a fundamental attribution error and no explanation can be fully satisfactory if it does not include all three categories of variables as well as their interactions. Our discipline perhaps more than most recognizes these complex
relationships.

Psychological research has given us considerable insight into some aspects of ethnic hostility. The work of Adorno et al. (1950) was the first attempt to validate a theory about the kind of family constellation and resultant personality Gestalt that makes people likely recruits to Fascism and other ethnocentric ideologies. Harvey et al. (1961) have suggested more generally how unilateral child-rearing patterns can produce adults whose minds, once set, are rigidly impervious to contradictory information. Other theorists, while not primarily concerned with developmental processes, have studied such relevant cognitive styles and social ideologies as dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and a belief in a hierarchical society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1998). We have probably paid too little attention to such individual traits as sensation-seeking (Zuckerman, 1994) and power motivation (Winter, 1973), both of which may play a role in the motivation of at least some perpetrators.

We understand some of the cognitive and emotional processes that exacerbate intergroup hostility. At the most basic level, reinforcement theories provide explanations for some aspects of persecution, which produce material benefits for the participants — removing professional competitors and turning the possessions of the persecuted group over to the persecutors — an obvious feature of the Holocaust. Both experimental and archival studies indicate that stress lowers the threshold for aggression, which may help to explain why difficult life conditions and stress-inducing training methods play a role in producing torturers and genocidal killers (Staub, 1989).

More subtly, the perceptual mechanisms of assimilation-contrast and leveling-sharpening lay the groundwork for stereotyping. These processes psychologically minimize differences within groups and exaggerate differences between groups (Secord et al., 1956). This makes it easier to see all of “them” as equally bad, and as equally worse than all of “us” — leading easily, by way of Lerner’s “just world” hypothesis (1980), to the thought that “they” deserve the suffering that is being imposed on them.

Personality theorists (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950) have explored the workings of several defence mechanisms involved in the devaluation of outgroups. Projection, for example, is thought to underlie the perception that the other group embodies all of the immoral acts and thoughts we cannot admit in ourselves, making them unworthy of acceptance and deserving of punishment. Another defence mechanism, compartmentalization, is the ability to raise cognitive and emotional barriers that wall off one domain of thought and activity from another. It was invoked in the Holocaust literature under the labels of “splitting off” (Dicks, 1972) and “doubling” (Lifton, 1986) to explain how people whose day-long occupation was mass murder could go home after work was done and enjoy a civilized family evening.

Sherif et al. (1961/1988) demonstrated how leaders, by framing situations in terms of intergroup competition, can produce hostility and aggressive behaviour between component groups. We can see the workings of an ingrained us-vs-them mentality in experimental “minimal” groups (Tajfel et al., 1971), which are composed in a completely arbitrary way and whose members never even meet each other. Evolutionary psychologists can explain how such ingroup-outgroup biases derive from strategies that improve reproductive fitness (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989): the group can maximize the survival of its own DNA if it can monopolize the resources available in the environment and prevent “alien” genes from entering its gene pool. The Nazi policies of expelling Jews from the national economy and forbidding “race mixing” (and their later counterparts) are compatible with these biological patterns.

Our colleagues have also illuminated some of the conditions that affect participation in aggressive acts against defenceless individuals. Milgram’s research (1974) has shown the prevalence, but also the limitations, of obedience to what appears to be legitimate authority. Kelman (1958), French and Raven (1959), and others have outlined the characteristics of leaders — legitimacy within cultural traditions, personal charisma, the power to reward and punish, the validity of their arguments — that make obedience more likely. Asch (1956) and Schachter (1951) demonstrated that even under unthreatening laboratory conditions, conformity to peer-group norms and pressures makes it difficult to dissent when those around us are fully convinced that they are right. Inhibitions against violence may erode when people see respected figures, such as uniformed military officers or physicians, endorse and practice it (Bandura, 1973). When the media and the government collude to magnify the level of solidarity and suppress evidence of opposition, the “false consensus” effect (Ross et al., 1977) will encourage persecutors by convincing them that support for their ideas and deeds is in fact unanimous.

We have seen how groupthink, a combination of ingroup pride, conformity, and leader-worship, may lead to the unthinking approval of decisions that are both immoral and disastrous (Janis, 1972). Kelman and Hamilton’s model (1989) of how moral inhibitions against violence are weakened, first by the approval of an authority figure, then by the very experience of committing violence, and last by the dehumanization of the victim group, seems valid for what they call “sanctioned massacres,” including the Holocaust and beyond. Staub
Jewish compatriots. Pastor Niemoeller's famous mea culpa, outlining the sequence of Nazi persecutions against which he did not take a stand because he was not personally affected, only to find that no one was left to intervene when he himself became the target, is a powerful summary of this phenomenon.

Some studies have indicated that people who are familiar with Milgram's obedience studies are less likely to obey hurtful commands, and that exposure to the diffusion of responsibility experiments increases the likelihood of helping. It may be that a similar "enlightenment effect" (Gergen, 1973) has played a role in motivating the actions of the UN and NATO in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia.

The same may be said of the international community's recent willingness to resettle survivors in a new and safe location. People trying to flee the Nazis were turned away by almost every Western country, and by all of the major ones. The attitude and actions of Canada's government are well summed up by the title of a book dealing with this event: "None is too many" (Abella & Troper, 1982). Perhaps enlightened by the eventual outcome, perhaps feeling guilty for rejecting thousands who then went to their deaths, more recent governmental policies have allowed for the immigration of survivors from Asian, African, and European persecutions.

Rescuers are different from bystanders. Few as they were in World War II — by some estimates, about 1% of the Christian population of Nazi-dominated countries — those who risked arrest and possible death by hiding Jews felt personal responsibility for saving innocent lives. Oliner and Oliner (1991) reported that many rescuers were "normocentric": obeying the norms of a particular reference group or belief system, frequently religious or political. Their initial intervention could be attributed to conformity or obedience, when a valued group such as family members or a church congregation, or an authority figure such as a priest, asked them to join in a rescue effort. In some cases, they followed the same foot-in-the-door, gradual escalation, of involvement as did the murderers whom they were trying to thwart: starting with small acts of kindness and moving on to greater and greater commitment (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). As shown by research on both helping behaviour and resistance to demands for aggressive behaviour, personal appeals by potential victims were powerful motivators for offering help, as was a perception that the person in need of help was similar to oneself (Batson, 1991).

Victims and survivors. I use the word "victim" to identify those who were persecuted, whether or not they eventually survived. For a representative sample of the "victim" group, the study would have to be done while the persecution is going on, obviously not a feasible procedure. Thus, most research on victims is really autobiography. Some of it is anecdotal, recounting episodes of selfishness and self-sacrifice, or presenting historical accounts of life and death in a particular camp or ghetto. Among the few systematic projects are the works of people like Bruno Bettelheim and Victor Frankl, who observed their own behaviour and that of their fellow inmates, and published their conclusions after liberation. Analyses of this sort have had mixed results. Bettelheim
(1943) mostly disparaged other inmates, highlighting for example "Muselmanism," a state of complete passivity and apathy that usually led to the rapid death of the prisoner, and identification with the aggressor, Anna Freud's concept that Bettelheim applied to inmates who acted like guards, abused other prisoners, wore bits of cast-off SS uniform, and so on. Bettelheim's analyses of concentration camp life have been criticized on the basis of his limited experience, unwarranted generalizations, and self-aggrandizing bias (e.g., Pollak, 1997).

Frankl (1963), on the other hand, emphasized how dedication to the goal of understanding enabled him to distance himself from his suffering, to adopt a dispassionate perspective, and after the war to develop a school of existential therapy focusing on the search for meaning. It is noteworthy that Aaron Antonovsky's (1982) concept of the characteristics that enhance survival under difficult conditions, published some 20 years later, focuses on the "sense of coherence": finding meaning in what is happening and seeing how it fits into the rest of one's life.

In contrast to the limited research on victims, psychiatric and psychological studies of Holocaust survivors are legion: almost 2,500 in Krell and Sherman's (1997) bibliography, which deals only with former concentration camp inmates. Until fairly recently, the focus has been clinical: concentrating on the pathological behaviours and outcomes. The combination of long-term sequelae supposedly affecting all survivors was labeled "survivor syndrome," or "persecution syndrome," or — most frequently — "concentration camp syndrome" (also known as "KZ syndrome," from the German abbreviation for Konzentrationslager) (Eitinger, 1964/1972). It included "survivor guilt" (which survivors supposedly suffered purely because they had lived whereas so many others had died), chronic diffuse anger and anxiety, sleep disturbances, anhedonia, flashbacks, hypervigilance, depression, psychosomatic and sexual dysfunctions, flashbacks and intrusive thoughts, inability to establish close emotional ties with others — in short, all of the symptoms now more generally subsumed under the term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 1980).

During the first decades after the end of the war, few professionals doubted that survivors, especially those who had been in the death camps, had lost all chances for a normal or even a tolerable life. A mental health professional called in to assess children liberated from Buchenwald predicted that none would ever be able to function in society: given the irreversible effects of early childhood experience, they were psychologically crippled forever (R. Waisman, personal communication). Many studies were based on clinical interviews, and explored the precise configuration of symptoms presented by the survivor patients. Eventually, the circle of interest expanded to include the children of survivor parents (the "Second Generation") and, in the past few years, their grandchildren (the "Third Generation") (see Klein-Parker, 1988).

The almost exclusive focus on pathology is beginning to change in response to empirical studies presenting contrary evidence. There is no doubt that there are survivors, and survivors' offspring, who are troubled and whose adjustment to life is marked by difficulties and disruptions (see, for example, Kestenberg, 1998). But the severity of these symptoms differs widely from person to person and from time to time, and a high proportion of survivors shows no serious afflictions of this sort at all (Lomranz, 1995). The occasional nightmare or episode of irritability is not outside the boundaries of normal experience, nor does it interfere with work, family, or recreation. Such findings have contributed to the growing re-orientation of psychology toward studying positive human traits and reactions: resilience, hardiness, effectance, and coping (Suedfeld, 1998).

Jerome Kagan (1994) and other developmental psychologists have refuted the old axiom that early childhood experience is the supreme determinant of adult personality. Children who survived the Holocaust provide compelling evidence for rejecting the traditional view. Youngsters who lived among massive violence, knew they could be its targets, were deprived of family support, food, shelter, adequate clothing, medical care — whose exposure to wounds and death was not via TV shows or video games — nevertheless mostly grew up to be normal and productive. For the most part, they healed themselves (Kestenberg, 1998). Incidentally, the group of irretrievably damaged Buchenwald children I mentioned earlier now includes among other outstanding citizens Robert Waisman, a respected businessman and philanthropist in Vancouver, Meir Lau, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, and Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel. Current research indicates no more psychopathology among the Second Generation than among other people of the same age (Fogelman, 1998) — unless one infers it from casual observations that they seem disproportionately represented in the helping professions, especially medicine, psychology, and social work.

In my own studies, we have discovered that a lower percentage of Holocaust survivors had ever felt the need to consult a mental health professional than was reported by a comparison group (North American Jews of appropriate age who had spent the Holocaust years in non-Nazi dominated countries). Survivors were successful at resolving psychosocial crises such as those outlined by Erikson (1959). They are fairly content with their life; somewhat less so than the comparison group, but around the middle portion of our scales. Their outlook on life...
and their attitudes about the world are essentially indistinguishable from those of the comparison group. We have found a few significant differences: survivors tend to trust other people less, ascribe people’s outcomes more to luck and chance than to personal control, and have a higher sense of self-worth (survivor pride). The results of our quantitative research (Suedfeld, 1998) are well in line with those of other recent reports based on qualitative methods (e.g., Hass, 1995; Helmreich, 1992; Marks, 1993).

The recognition of the hardness and resilience of the survivors is part of an ongoing change in the psychological world view, emphasizing the strengths and positive characteristics of human beings (cf. Anthony & Cohler, 1987; Higgins, 1994; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lifton, 1995; Segal, 1986). Such a change should spark at least two further research efforts. One is to analyze just how the coping and adaptation processes function. For example, almost all of the survivors ever studied had emigrated from their original homelands, and there is evidence that their country of resettlement is an important variable in adjustment. Although anecdotal accounts indicate that many survivors (especially young ones) were eager to assimilate during the years after they arrived — to become more Canadian than the Canadians — time and historical events can redirect that ambition (Klein-Parker, 1988). It would be interesting to use John Berry’s model to study how they relate to the new culture and also how their relationship to the host culture may have changed as they aged (Berry, 1997).

Second, it is important to compare this group with survivors and refugees from more recent persecutions. Holocaust survivors have had more than 50 years to reflect upon and make sense of their experiences; would studying that process help us to predict the life-span development of Southeast Asian Boat People, Tibetans, Tutsis, Somalis, Bosnians, Kosovars, and other traumatized immigrants to the West? Some research on Vietnamese and Laotian refugees, who have now been settled in Canada for a dozen years or so, shows similarities in their ability to adapt successfully, but a wider and continuing research effort is needed (Beiser & Johnson, 1994).

PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS
Psychology is a profession as well as a science, and there is a significant place for psychologists in the practical problems of ethnopoliitical persecution. The CPA-APA Initiative is engaged in facilitating this involvement. At this point, we are primarily pursuing two paths:

1. Although psychological expertise probably cannot prevent genocide (after all, psychiatrists have been prominent in both the Nazi and the present-day Serbian “ethnic cleansing”), there is hope in the fact that many of our colleagues are involved in improving and applying the techniques of nonviolent conflict resolution. Herbert Kelman (1998), a distinguished social psychologist and himself a refugee from the Nazis, has long been involved in conducting conflict resolution workshops that bring together Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, teaching the techniques of peaceful negotiation: understanding the other side’s point of view and their emotional arousal cues, identifying areas of agreement and common interests as well as rivalry. His work has recently expanded to involve Cypriots as well as other opposing groups in volatile ethnopoliitical confrontation. Among Canadian colleagues, Ronald Fisher (1997) is pursuing similar work. Gordon Allport’s (1954) strategy for reducing ethnic prejudice through the joint pursuit of shared goals, and Elliot Aronson’s tactic of distributing across ethnic groups the information that is critical to success (Aronson et al., 1978), are among the many ideas that psychologists have advanced for enhancing intergroup cooperation and acceptance.

2. When prevention fails, intervention is needed. Psychology has long and deep experience in treating those who have been emotionally marked by stress, trauma, and disaster of all sorts (van der Kolk et al., 1996). Canadian psychologists have stepped in with counseling and therapy for survivors of natural as well as man-made catastrophes: fires, floods, air crashes, and many less-publicized tragedies (e.g., Nova Scotia Psychologist, 1998). One goal of the APA-CPA Initiative is to strengthen psychology in bringing this expertise to bear on the widespread upheaval of ethnopoliitical conflict, not only to help local survivors but also to support other rescue and aid workers and military peacekeepers. We would like more psychologists to be on site when needed and to have them train indigenous practitioners in the use of the most appropriate psychological techniques to help their afflicted compatriots. Eventually, we should also intervene to help resettled survivors to adapt to their new milieux, but the Initiative has not yet addressed this issue.

Conclusion
Anniversaries are a time for facing both the past and the future. But we can face either of those only in memory and in imagination, because where we live is in the present. The Holocaust, now more than 50 years in the past, reverberates in our present, in the memory of thousands of survivors, perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers, and in a massive archive of documentary and fictional publications, films, artworks, and television shows. Many are widely known and acclaimed: I need mention only The Diary of Anne Frank, Schindler’s List, and the recent Oscar winner, Life is Beautiful.

Unfortunately, the Holocaust also foreshadowed the
future, qui fait l'objet de l'initiative conjointe sur la guerre ethnopolitique (SCP-APA). Cette recherche tente d'expliquer pourquoi les gens participent à un génocide, d'analyser le comportement des témoins et des sauveurs, et d'élaborer des interventions pouvant contribuer à prévenir ou à désamorcer les conflits ethniques et à en atténuer les effets. Des études psychologiques des survivants de l'Holocauste ont contribué à notre connaissance du SSPT (syndrome de stress post-traumatique), de la transmission des traumatismes aux générations subséquentes, ainsi que de la possibilité d'adaptation et de récupération après un stress extrême.

Résumé
La tentative nazie d'annihiler le peuple juif a pris fin, il y a plus de 50 ans, mais, aux yeux du public et des érudits, l'Holocauste conserve une grande importance et comprend des éléments psychologiques majeurs. Il est encore le thème de nombreux romans, pièces de théâtre et films, et est aussi fréquemment utilisé comme métaphore dans des débats de politique, par exemple pour justifier les frappes aériennes de l'OTAN contre la Yougoslavie. La recherche en psychologie reliée à l'Holocauste peut contribuer à mieux comprendre la violence ethnopolitique subséquente, voire future, qui fait l'objet de l'initiative conjointe sur la

Références


